Does Conceptions + Causations = Science?
I have written about conceptions (blog 19) and causations (blog 6); however if you add them together do you have science? I started reading ‘Making Things Happen’ by James Woodward, and he promotes a pragmatic description of science as the useful manipulation of causal events. It seems to me that with the building blocks we have created that we could create a conceptual 'Theory of Science’ that would satisfy pragmatic needs, and this theory would also add a more absolute nature to scientific truth with the techno-religious status that brings - as well as being compatible with religion as set out in blogs 17-18. Is this desirable?
I am not embarrassed to aim for a certain level of hypothetical certainty in theory, even if it is not completely escaping some relativism, perceptual baggage etc. There is more charm in claiming to talk about the universe than in talking about how to manipulate an unknown system in order to make money or other goals, which strikes me as rather an ugly personal philosophy, and especially when such a level of cynicism is not necessary. Of course in reality we treat our deeper theories as absolute (see blog 18). Science, like philosophy, has a number of roles, but it has as yet not been adequately defined by philosophy, although there have been attempts like falsificationism. Perhaps we could separate out the natural philosophy from the conceptions and causations of science itself. I shall treat this blog 23 as a pinnacle on previous blogs, more important for the view than the new elevation. So let us finish the journey to see what we can see.
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When we look at science we see several approaches in its day to day description; for example if you put “what is science” into YouTube (March 2022) you get a mish mash of the semantic (i.e. science is learning through observation); the practical steps (like observation, hypothesis, observation, communication, review, and acceptance); and the aims of science (i.e. wondrous technology or a greater understanding of the universe). However, I would like to suggest that all of these approaches are looking at science side on rather than top down as would be philosophical. One side is the inputs, another side the outputs, but none of these elements are necessary to make up the science in the middle. So as Woodward points out there is presently a significantly different approach to the theory of scientific activity depending on which branch of science you attend to and even between scientists in a similar field. A simple example might be in economic science, with some economists thinking complex mathematical models are economics, while others holding models are a distraction from observing the reality that is the interplay of economic forces in circumstances that are often cultural or non-linear or unknowable. It could be that some things scientists think of as science are psychological, practical, mundane, or excessively idealised.
As this is a philosophical blog, we need to seek the schematic for the conception of science. From blog 19, conceptions were defined as:
1) Named and referenced
2) Have a schematic
3) The schematic creates names or allows the substitution of a name for other names
4) Does not exist as an object
5) Is expressed in the hyperreal
6) Is an extension of language
7) Can be compatible with an implicit logic or model
Once we start analysing conceptions of science, we can see there is more than one, or many. For example, 'Science’ can be an administrative generalisation for the faculties or set of courses that administer science qualifications that meet the technical requirements of at least a Bachelor’s degree in science. The technical requirements might talk of having high standard assessed elements of theory, the ability to access and assess prior research, experimental practice, use of technology and technique, and relevant mathematical tools. So there is a conception related to science as a degree that is named and referenced (1); (2&3) has a schematic where it is a substitutable generalisation for all the relevant degrees; (4) science itself is not a physical object but is expressed in (5) a hyperreal advert for the rigour of the subjects, while extending language (6) with the logic of the technological term (7). However, even in concluding this conception of science is valid, I do not think it is the best explanation of science if we wanted to give science a techno-religious status. So we shall have to start again.
Let us try to abstract a conceptual schematic for science in a different way, a mixture of root cause analysis, definition, observation, and implication and metaphysics. First, science is associated with observed knowledge (for example based on its Latin root), however, as we saw in blog 14, language terms generally are associated with the organisation of observations directly or indirectly; so, as this is metaphysically general, science needs to be more specific unless you want to deconstruct science and the framing of our neuro-linguistic world view. Given normal usage of science, I don’t think we want to collapse it with this other related epistemological model we discussed in blog 14 as we want to give science a special status. There are not that many things in our domain of discourse as set out in these blogs that science could substitute for, however we can have a conception (blog 19), which includes a generalisation (blog 5). Also for science we have causation as a thing that is necessarily and implicitly observed in accepting the possibility of making valid observations (as set out in blog 6). So we can consolidate this to show experimental science involves making generalisations of causations, and theoretical science involves making conceptions of the generalisations of causations. These conceptions are our incarnation of scientific laws; so not given by monotheism, but because conceptions + causations = science.
So we are, with the help of James Woodward, expressing the nature of science as a relationship of 'a’ observes 'b’, where 'a’ is the scientist and 'b’ is a causal demonstration of the physical world existing. We can add to that 'a’ generalises 'b’ to create 'c’ a causal conception. And also 'a’ systematises 'c’ to organise further 'world-mechanics’ conceptions ’d’. The move from 'c’ to ’d’ is similar to the creation of grand narrative, religion, philosophy, or rationalist modelling, but based on the specific nature of d’s relationship with 'c’, and its special relationship with 'b’ in the mind of 'a’; so it is science that 'a’ is performing in this case when he claims ’d’.
By systematising causal observations, we can lift them from the mundane to the general, to the universal, to techno-religious status. A victory within limits. However, could you or another theorist downgrade this? It seems that to change this conception for another one would be difficult as you would be making a different conception and calling it “science”. A new 'science-like’ conception would not be boxed in by the limitations set out in the prior blogs with its limits not being chosen on the merits of the previous blogs, so would need substantive justification. So we first defined science as a taught faculty subject group, and then science as a deep concept, a deep knowledge methodology. Obviously language is mutable so you could have other conceptions of science, for example science within a post-doctoral research facility, or as a department in a company. However, these are additions, not replacements of the concept of science as a techno-religious investigation of causal conceptions which is its most general and basic foundation.
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We can perhaps consider other conceptions: For example, the observations of relations between hyper real objects (see blog 11) could be demarcated from science where the hyper real objects do not represent and model causal reality. Literature studies or law are rich in narrative causation, but are not science. To this non-science I would add other abstract art and logics like theories with impossible postulates (as discussed in blogs 19 and 21). In this way certain higher mathematics and logic is not scientific, which may be a shock to some, but given its extreme creativity and detachment from reality, it is a rendering of impossible meaning, so while technically virtuoso, it is actually art.
We can remark that some areas are not scientific, but also that the reverse is true. In blog 8 we described the non-reductionist modelling that might occur, for example if a scientifically minded historian made a computerised model of the economy of the Roman empire. This attempt to model the historical reality and its causal relations might be as scientific as modelling the impact of mammoths on the northern ecosystems, so possibly quite scientific, but more importantly it is the approach rather than the fact categorisation that is significant.
In defence of the status quo, perhaps the different conceptions of science mean that science is not one thing. Splitting parts of the formal sciences out while expanding the social sciences to include technical treatments of arts subjects may not be accepted even as a trend. It could be that our philosophy is now far in advance of common usage, including amongst scientists.
The elevation of this blog is not going to induce vertigo, but given the dominant religion of a technological society is science, we should consider its limitations seriously. For example, when someone argues that infinite infinities is a number, should we assume they are being mystical or artistic or religious or outside of religion or scientific or metaphysical. Your guardianship of this kind of question controls whether you will let mystical elements of the folk religions into your science religion. Likewise the necessity of linking concepts to generalisations to observations of change grounds science away from idle speculation. So whether the scientific concepts originated in what order, observation or theory or communication, or various observations and theories is circumstance irrelevant to a philosophical definition of science. A philosophical description of science is an exacting reference to why it is an attractive method of finding and organising knowledge of the empirical world and isn’t just a description of the world’s usage of the scientific term. Science is a concept, and I conclude that this concept of science is at least as worthwhile as what has gone before.
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I would like to conclude these blogs, a journey of many steps towards defining our dominant religion. It shows that science is more than speculation, pragmatism, induction, rationalisation, faith. We show how it is different from pure logic and various truths; we show that it is an incomplete description with religious gaps, and show what these terms mean. This is all part of the wonderful walkway we have passed through. Now all this philosophy has emptied itself onto the page, I am a mere shell. I am a shell that knows little, but has faith in human endeavour, science, concept building, truth, and even metaphysics. These are worthwhile pursuits, and I accept their necessity as part of an intelligent and free thinking life.
I would have liked to have described conceptions from blog 19 in more detail, so I leave you with this table comparing three conceptions. By showing their differences you can think things through for yourself. This method I call simply a Conceptual Table.
