Google is gearing Chrome up for the post-quantum future, testing new crypto to keep today’s data safe from tomorrow’s quantum attacks. https://jpmellojr.blogspot.com/2026/03/google-prepares-chrome-for-post-quantum.html
T&M for Validating Performance and Compliance of Post-Quantum-Secure Systems
TM for validating performance and compliance of post-quantum secure systems highlights the critical role of trusted methodologies in ensuring tomorrow’s cryptographic solutions are both secure and efficient. As quantum-resistant technologies gain traction, robust validation frameworks will be essential for building confidence and compliance in next-generation cybersecurity. Read this full article by: Sameh Yamany, Chief Technology Officer, VIAVI Solutions.
Novel Study Defines Essential Post-Quantum Boundaries for Distributed Lovász Local Lemma
Because of its inherent difficulty, the distributed Lovász local lemma (LLL) has long been considered a fundamental topic in the field of distributed computing. Recent years have seen a rise in interest in these complexity issues, and significant progress has been made in determining their computational boundaries. Researchers Tim Göttlicher and Sebastian Brandt of Saarland University and the CISPA Helmholtz Centre for Information Security have made a major breakthrough by establishing a precise lower restriction for solving the distributed LLL.
This groundbreaking study provides the first superconstant lower limit for both the well-studied sinkless orientation example and the more general distributed LLL problem. This achievement represents a major advance in understanding the inherent computational difficulty of these problems. By coming to this result, the researchers have directly addressed significant open questions in the field of distributed algorithms.
The team’s findings establish a fundamental limit on the difficulty of resolving the distributed computing LLL problem. This constraint illustrates a fundamental restriction on the speed at which certain problems can be fixed in a distributed setting.
Reaching the Boundaries: Complexity and Models
To arrive at this conclusion, the researchers focused on sinkless orientation, a specific instance of the Lovász Local Lemma(LLL). They demonstrated that the given lower bound holds true even in computing environments that are regarded as more resilient or constrictive than the traditional O(1)-LOCAL model.
Crucially, the report accurately defines and employs the rigorous randomized online-LOCAL strategy. Computational nodes, which represent vertices in a graph, exchange messages with their neighbors during synchronous rounds. Each node has the ability to send and receive messages of any size and perform an endless number of internal calculations with the information it has gathered.
Nodes have significant limitations: they initially don’t know the graph’s general structure and only know a few local details, such their degree, the number of nodes (n), and the port numbers allotted to incident edges. In the randomized variant of this paradigm, every node is furthermore equipped with an endlessly long, private random bit string that influences its calculations.
Here, algorithm complexity is defined as the worst-case number of rounds needed for all nodes to terminate correctly. In order for the algorithms to have a high probability of generating accurate results, the probability must be at least 1−1/n, where n is the number of nodes. This is essential.
Crucially, the researchers also considered the quantum-LOCAL idea. This model improves on the randomized LOCAL model by utilizing qubits for quantum computing and communication. The paper demonstrates that the lower bounds hold rigorously for both the randomized online-LOCAL and quantum-LOCAL versions of the model. The result’s broad application supports its broad significance across multiple study populations.
The Superconstant Barrier’s Establishment
The study’s primary achievement is the first superconstant lower limit for sinkless orientation and the more general distributed LLL problem across various relevant computing architectures.
The team’s assessment of complexity validates a crucial constraint. Their approach involved analyzing the communication requirements seen in algorithms designed to solve the LLL problem. The findings demonstrate that any algorithm must execute at least Ω(1) communication rounds in the worst case. This solution is applicable to many other related models and provides the first superconstant lower limit for sinkless orientation and the more general LLL problem.
A New Method for Establishing Boundaries
The researchers employed a novel lower limit technique to measure this complexity. This new approach could serve as a universal tool for calculating bounds for a wide range of important problems studied in the location context.
Brandt and Göttlicher devised a technique that involved constructing a “construction tree.” This building tree effectively encodes a set of behaviors that lead to a specific computational output. The study team is optimistic that this approach offers a promising path to even more durable lower bounds in the future, despite the fact that the size of graphs that the current architecture can reliably manage is restricted. They believe that this novel approach could lead to a new, generic approach to prove computation bounds for problems studied in the locality context.
The study has the potential to further develop computational limit proofing in the field by introducing this novel approach. This finding gives the first superconstant lower bound for sinkless orientation and the more general distributed Lovász local lemma across several computing models.
Infineon Launches PQC-Certified Security Controller for a Quantum-Safe Future
Infineon Technologies has become the first company ever to receive Common Criteria EAL6 certification for deploying a post-quantum cryptography (PQC) algorithm in a security controller. This breakthrough enhances protection for eSIMs, 5G SIMs, smart cards, eHealth IDs — making critical infrastructure resilient against future quantum threats.
Quantum-resistant cryptography: practical steps to protect apps from quantum threats using lattice-based (Kyber/Dilithium) and hash-based (SPHINCS+) schemes. Hybrid TLS, liboqs PoCs, PKI tips, and a hands-on checklist to start today.
The age of quantum risk has begun, but many organisations are still treating it as tomorrow’s problem. A new report warns that delaying action could leave critical sectors exposed to future decryption of today’s sensitive data.
[[MORE]]The Cyber Threat Alliance’s latest report urges companies to adopt cryptographic agility to defend against the gradual but accelerating threat posed by quantum computing. Attackers are already harvesting encrypted data today, intending to decrypt it later when quantum capabilities mature. Hybrid post-quantum schemes, cryptographic asset inventories, and modular system designs are key to staying ahead. Quantum Key Distribution, while promising in theory, remains impractical at scale and should not replace post-quantum cryptography.
Sources: Help Net Security | Cyber Threat Alliance
NordVPN has implemented post-quantum encryption on all platforms to combat future quantum attacks.
NordVPN, a leading cybersecurity service, released post-quantum encryption across all its VPN apps. This crucial upgrade has been fully implemented across all supported platforms to prevent large-scale quantum computers from decrypting user data.
Implementation began with the September 2024 version of NordVPN Linux. This phase includes the first post-quantum NordLynx protocol cryptographic improvement in a Linux software update. WireGuard calls NordLynx a fast and secure VPN protocol. The revised technique met NIST’s latest post-quantum encryption criteria. Linux deployments aimed to protect users against quantum decryption and measure performance metrics like latency and connection rates.
“The collected data served as a stepping stone to quantum-resistant encryption on the rest of the platforms,” said NordVPN CTO Marijus Briedis. He said, “The Linux case demonstrated that it successfully maintained the highest level of user experience in terms of connection time and speed during the transition”. This initial phase’s accomplishment cleared the way for post-quantum cryptography support in other applications.
NordVPN brought PQE to Windows, macOS, iOS, Android, tvOS, and Android TV in 2025. Any software that supports PQE can now use it. PQE upgrade adds quantum-resistant algorithms to NordLynx. The protocol meets the latest NIST post-quantum encryption standards. The implementation follows August 2024 US National Institute of requirements and Technology (NIST) post-quantum cryptography requirements. NordVPN uses quantum-safe mathematical methods in its VPN infrastructure to secure data long-term.
We took preventive steps because we thought quantum computer technology might threaten us. Quantum computing uses quantum physics to calculate tenfold faster than digital computers. Even in its infancy, quantum computing could outperform the fastest systems. It could break encryption systems, but this massive power could benefit space exploration and medicine by modelling molecules to repair ailments.
Due of quantum computers’ processing power, cybersecurity is difficult. Quantum computers may swiftly surpass RSA encryption, which takes ordinary computers hundreds of years to master, researchers say. Such computational capacity threatens governments, corporations, and individuals.
Experts say hackers are already storing encrypted data for later deciphering, which is the biggest issue with quantum computers. Marijus Briedis suggests cybercriminals are increasing their “harvest now, decrypt later” tactics. They want to collect massive amounts of encrypted data to decrypt after quantum technology is mastered. Quantum computing is still in its infancy, but securing critical data now improves cybersecurity for consumers and organisations.
Due to this, large IT corporations, governments, and organisations like the FBI and CIA are monitoring the technology’s development and seeking post-quantum encryption solutions. NordVPN implemented post-quantum cryptography to protect private data from quantum criminals. By incorporating PQE into their VPN infrastructure today and in the post-quantum era, NordVPN hopes to protect their clients’ data. This launch marks a “major transition to new-generation encryption of all our applications, providing long-term security for our users” according to Briedis.
PQE is easy to enable. A toggle switch in the app’s “Settings” under “Connections” enables it. The function will automatically start when the user connects via NordLynx once activated. Remember to disable PQE while using obfuscated servers or protocols like OpenVPN. It also conflicts with Meshnet and other features.
Implementing post-quantum encryption is challenging and resource-intensive. Newer security methods require larger key sizes and signatures. This may increase computational cost and VPN speed and performance, especially in high-throughput settings.
With this complete implementation, NordVPN joins Mullvad and ExpressVPN in offering full PQE integration. Reports say other providers are implemented at various stages. NordVPN is part of industry-wide efforts to future-proof digital privacy for “Q-Day” threats.
Concerning NORDVPN NordVPN, the world’s most advanced VPN provider, is trusted by millions of internet users. The service offers dedicated IP, Double VPN, and Onion Over VPN servers to improve online anonymity with zero monitoring. A key feature of NordVPN is Threat Protection Pro, which scans downloads for malware and blocks hazardous websites, trackers, and adverts. NordVPN, a part of Nord Security, launched Saily, a global eSIM service. NordVPN is known for its user-friendly design and over 7,600 servers in 118 countries at the cheapest prices.
Agencies Prioritise Post-Quantum Cryptography Acquisitions for Upcoming Threats
Post-quantum cryptography (PQC) requirements are being aggressively pushed into government agencies’ acquisition processes as part of a multiyear campaign to secure sensitive data from future quantum computers.
Concerns about “harvest now, decrypt later” are fuelling this push. Even though quantum computers that can crack current encryption techniques are not expected for at least ten years, U.S. officials worry that adversaries may be stealing encrypted data now, storing it, and then waiting to decrypt it when more advanced quantum systems are available. This makes the modification urgent and necessary.
NIST, NSA, ONCD, and CISA lead this effort. Post-quantum cryptography was discussed by these federal agencies and 600 federal IT workers.
CISA associate chief of strategic technology Garfield Jones stressed agency awareness. He encouraged federal agencies to add PQC requirements directly in purchase papers as suppliers adopt new standards.
The government’s strong transition guidelines show bipartisan support. In 2022, former President Joe Biden set a national security goal to minimise “as much quantum risk as feasible” by 2035. After that, the OMB ordered federal agencies to assess their most essential IT assets and establish thorough PQC transition plans. Biden signed a cybersecurity executive order with new PQC requirements in January. The Trump administration has not reversed either of Biden’s cyber orders, indicating that the policy would remain important.
The January presidential directive ordered CISA to issue a list of post-quantum cryptography-compatible product categories by mid-July. Federal agencies must include PQC requirements in solicitations for products that may support this list within 90 days of CISA’s release.
This transition is being prepared by NIST, which released three post-quantum cryptography standards last year. CISA is working with companies to evaluate their cryptographic solutions as it constructs its PQC device list.
Many organisations are still in the early phases of adoption despite these efforts. Despite 69% of organisations knowing about quantum computing’s dangers, only 5% have embraced quantum-safe encryption, according to a DigiCert poll.
Todd Hemmen, FBI Cyber Technical Analytics and Operations section chief, said the ten-year transformation plan requires urgency and a “thought-driven, process-driven approach”. He reiterated the “harvest now, decrypt later” principle, warning that public information may be hacked later. But he noted that government agencies rarely had to make hasty decisions.
New PQC algorithms present significant challenges. Jones said these algorithms are “a little heavier” than usual. Federal agencies should anticipate operational technology implementation issues. He advised federal agencies to work with vendors, understand their roadmaps, and include needs into purchase agreements and policy to avoid surprises.
Along with technical and integration issues, funding is a big obstacle. OMB estimates, which excluded sensitive systems used by the Defence Department and intelligence community, projected the government-wide transfer at $7.1 billion over ten years.
Landon Van Dyke, State Department senior counsellor for technology adoption and strategy, says PQC may be harder to fund than AI. He stressed that a successful PQC transition’s principal benefit—a safe, breach-free “quiet day”—is not the clear ROI executives seek. According to Van Dyke, leaders must be convinced that “if you don’t do it, we’re in trouble.” He added, “And they’ll ask, ‘Well, what’s my return?’” Return on a calm day.
Post-quantum cryptography in government acquisitions balances the threat’s long-term nature with the urgent requirement to secure sensitive data.
So, I am away from computer for four days for a really cool event and I come back and in the mean time they maybe found a polynomial quantum attack against Learning With Errors, a lattice problem? (https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/555) If this paper is correct then this is some serious breaking news shit, because lattices are like the main candidate for quantum-secure public key cryptography. (there are others but they are much less practical and for other types there have also been attacks) I mean, this paper seems to attack just a particular setting, is very impractical and does not work for schemes that are actually proposed, but an existing impractical attack often signals the way for more practical attacks. So, if it is not a false alarm, this is pretty big. It could signal the attackability of lattice schemes and undermine the trust in them. And it takes a long time to move to a new standard. Oh well. I guess we have to wait for experts to check the paper for mistakes before we can say anything.
Post-quantum cryptography (PQC) algorithms should be implemented to replace vulnerable traditional public key cryptography (PKC) algorithms to mitigate the threat of quantum computers.
What if a key piece of cryptography underpinning bitcoin fell aside? That would possibly sound like science fiction (and even FUD – concern, uncertainty and doubt) to many a cryptocurrency fanatic, but infrequently a day is going by means of with out some breakthrough within the box of quantum computing hitting the wires. And whilst…
The New Ways to Save Crypto from a Post-Quantum World was originally published on Daily Cryptocurrency News