Does Culture or Economics Shape Modernity?
From here.
Non-Western Modernities and Alternative Globalizations: Sociological Perspectives, by Mikhail Maslovskiy, Russian Sociological Review, 24 no. 4, 2025.
This article examines globalization through the theoretical lens of multiple modernities, emphasizing the limitations of “reductionist” approaches (particularly world-systems theory) and advancing a multidimensional understanding of global processes. Building on critiques by Shmuel Eisenstadt and Johann Arnason, the author argues that globalization cannot be reduced to economic dynamics alone but must be understood as an interaction of economic, political, cultural, and civilizational dimensions, each with its own logic and temporalities. Arnason’s rejection of rigid “system” models in favour of globalizing processes highlights the plurality and irreducibility of sociocultural spheres.
The article reviews dominant perspectives on the temporalities of globalization, distinguishing between long-term (500-year), medium-term (250-year), and recent (50-year) frameworks. It situates these within the multiple modernities approach, drawing especially on Göran Therborn’s analysis of successive waves of globalization and de-globalization. From this perspective, contemporary trends—marked by crises since 2008 and renewed geopolitical conflict—suggest a shift toward de-globalization and the growing importance of global politics rather than economic integration alone. Globalization is taken to be a spread of a certain type of modernity (roughly, neoliberalism) which has now come into crisis, leading to “multiple globalizations.”
A central contribution of the article is its discussion of Arnason’s analysis of the Soviet mode of globalization. Arnason conceptualizes communism as an alternative modernity with global reach, shaped by revolutionary ideology, imperial legacies, and civilizational patterns. He emphasizes the multidimensional character of Soviet globalization, encompassing political expansion, ideological diffusion, and civilizational rivalry with Western liberal modernity. While the Soviet project achieved significant geopolitical influence, it ultimately failed to construct a viable alternative world economy or a sustainable civilizational model. The Sino-Soviet split further weakened the global communist project, revealing deep civilizational and cultural fractures within communist modernity itself. Arnason interprets the collapse of the Soviet model as the result of intertwined economic, political, and cultural factors, resisting monocausal explanations.
The article also highlights the influence of Arnason’s framework on historical sociology and post-communist studies, particularly in analyses of Russia’s post-Soviet transformations. The multiple modernities perspective is shown to be useful for understanding Russia’s oscillation between openness to Western models and later conservative, civilizationally framed rejections of Western modernity.
In its second major empirical focus, the article applies the multiple modernities framework to China’s rise. It argues that contemporary China represents a distinct configuration combining capitalist economy, Marxist-Leninist political structures, and selective revival of civilizational and imperial legacies, notably Confucianism. Drawing on Arnason, Therborn, and others, the article critiques simplistic notions of China as a monolithic “civilizational state,” stressing instead the recombination of old and new elements and the enduring influence of imperial trajectories. Initiatives such as the Belt and Road are interpreted as potential expressions of an emerging alternative mode of globalization shaped by China’s historical experience.
The conclusion argues that the multiple modernities approach is compatible with, and enriching for, globalization studies. It allows for the analysis of multiple globalizations associated with different forms of modernity and overcomes the limitations of economically reductionist theories. The Soviet Union is interpreted as a failed alternative globalization, while China is presented as a more ambiguous and evolving case whose global role may represent a new, historically grounded form of alternative globalization.
What it means for radicals: It’s not clear how much the Russian state influences the output of this journal or its authors, but the argument made fits well with its aspirations. The driver for denying that modernity is an effect of western power or of a single developmental model may well be the Russian state’s attempts to both modernize (or defend its modernity) and to assert its difference from the west. Maslovskiy seems to be advocating what decolonial theorists call “dewesternization,” i.e. a continuation of modern civilization and capitalism but with a cultural superstructure different from that of the west. This allows emerging powers to position themselves as anti-colonial while continuing colonial legacies.
I’m surprised to see Weberian developmentalists/social scientists popping up in this context, but in retrospect it makes sense. People like Eisenstadt and Therborn are in favour of modernity, but do not wish it to be tied to an expansion of western culture. They also allow enough political economy to realistically handle situations involving it, without going the whole way like Marxists or world systems theorists. I would suggest that this article is also somewhat reductionist, but that it replaces socioeconomic factors with cultural/civilizational factors. Historically, the idea of culture or civilization as a driving force is older than the idea of a socioeconomic base, and is typically associated with rightist and ethnocentric theories (although it’s also common in poststructuralist and identity-political approaches today). The idea that Germany in particular could modernize without succumbing to the horrors of British or French history was fashionable in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and education and culture tended to be cast as panaceas which would humanize modernity. It didn’t exactly work in Germany, and I suspect the whole project is flawed for a particular reason. Cultures arise as systems of meanings connected to everyday experiences, not as systems of norms which guide and determine life. While cultural change is slow, a discontinuity between actual social conditions and cultural values will sooner or later generate a rupture between the two. For example, ideas that everything is interconnected are quite sustainable in a horticultural society, but they run up against the reality of class divisions in highly stratified societies, and when adopted in atomized and competitive modern societies, they can only be maintained as dogmas or fantasies with no impact on actual socioeconomic actions – unless they are articulated as part of a lived revolutionary project of some kind. In the same way, metaphors of “weaving” which come naturally in places where people actually weave clothes become rather amorphous in contexts where clothes are mass-produced in factories. I’m sceptical whether culture can affect economics, unless it is enforced as moral economy by the popular sectors or inspires alternative paths away from dominant models of development.